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In the Supre111e Court of the
State of Utah
UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cros~appellant,
CASE
NO. 9159

vs.
ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al.,
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO.,
Defendant and Appellant.

J

Answering Brief of Respondent, Utah Savings

and Loan Association, to Brief of Appellant
Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company
STATEMENT OF FACTS

With some of the allegations in Appellant's Statement
of Facts, Respondent agrees. As to others, we think they
are immaterial to the issues, contrary to specific findings
of the Trial Court not directly challenged in this appeal,
and are conclusions, either without basis in the evidence or
based upon isolated testimony of one witness without regard
to contradictory testimony appearing elsewhere in the recSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ord. Our primary objection to the Statement, however, is
that we think it is incomplete to properly consider the legal
issues involved.
In order to clarify the position of Respondent, we believe it necessary to restate the facts, as we see them, from
the pleadings, Trial Court orders, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and the evidence, or lack of it, in the
record. In such manner, it is believed that the f.aots which
we consider essential to a proper consideration of the cases
can be added more appropriately, and areas of agreement
and disagreement with Appellant's Statement will be more
apparent than if ~an attempt were made to take each individual "fact" as stated by the Appellant and either agree
or disagree therewith or argue its materiality.

'Dhis appeal involves three separate mortgage foreclosure actions which were consolidated for trial and were
tried together in the lower court. In each case, Respondent, fby its Complaint, sought to foreclose construction
mortgages which had been executed in its favor by Robert
B. Mecham, as an owner builder, and his wife, Ruth W. Mecham, as to ·her statutory dower interest. (Plf. Exhibits
1-24, Civil 20,575, Exhibits 1-6, Civil No. 20,591, and Exhibits 1-4, ·Civil No. 20,592). The Complaint in Civil No.
20,575 contains twenty-four separate causes of action to
foreclose twenty-four separate mortgages on twenty-four
separate houses in various stages of completion in an area
in Orem, Utah County, called "La Mesa". The Complaints
in Civil Nos. 20,591 and 20,592 contain six and four causes
of action, respectively, to foreclose six separate mortgages
on six .separate houses referred to as "Schauerhamer" in
Case No. 20,591, and four separate mortgages on four separate houses referred to as "Rowley" in Case No. 20,592,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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which areas are also in Orem. The relative locations of
these areas are shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 in Civil No.
20,575, and individual plats of the areas are shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 in Civil No. 20,575, Exhibit 15 in Civil No.
20,591, and Exhibit 20, in Civil No. 20,5~2.
In each of the three cases, the mortgagors and all
other persons known to claim some interest in the properties were named as defendants, there being 24 such defendants in Civil No. 20,575, 11 in Civil No. 20,591 and 19 in
Civil No. 20,592. Most of the defendants were mechanics
lien claimants under Notices of Lien filed by them, covering various portions of land from one lot in one area (il)ef.
Exhibit 78, Civil No. 20,575) to 5 separate areas covering
more than 100 lots, as in the case of Appellant, on which
Mecham had commenced the construction of houses, and
to \vhich they claimed to have furnished materials. There
were some others such as the United States which claimed
tax liens as against Mecham, and the Industrial Commission which claimed a judgment lien as against Mecham.
Most of the claims of the various defendants have! !been
settled or purchased by Respondent, and some others have
been disposed of by orders of the Trial Court, from which
orders no appeals have been taken. Appellant was made
a party defendant in each of the three cases because its Notice of Lien included the property :sought to be foreclosed,
but not all of the defendants in each of the cases are the
same.
To the Complaints for foreclosure of Respondent's
separate mortgages in each of the three cases, Appellant
filed Answers and Cross-claims, which, for all practical
purposes, were identical. (R. 38, Civil No. 20,575, R. 16,
Civil No. 20,591, and R . 13, Civil No. 20,592). Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bet forth therein in all three cases its claim of mechanic's
lien and in each prayed that the property described in
Plaintiff's Complaint be sold and the sale proceeds applied
to the payment of its claims in the amount of $18,653.67
with interest.
Five months later, on June 9, 1958, Appellant filed an
Amended Answer, Counteuclaim, and Cross-claim in each
of the three cases, and again prayed that the lands described in Plaintiff's Complaint be sold and that the proceeds of the sale be applied to the payment of its lien. ( R.
79, C'ivil No. 20,575, R. 47, Civil No. 20,592, R. 58, Civil No.
20,59·2 ) .
Just prior to the conclusion of the tii:al on December
17, 1958, Appellant filed a Second Amended Answer and
Counterclaim and Cross-claim in each case, and again
prayed in each that the property described in Plaintiff's
Complaint be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment
of the lien. (R. 161, Civil No. 20,575, R. 47, Civil No. 20,591, R. 85, Civil No. 20,592).
As will more fully appear herein, the significance of
Appellant's pleadings is that (1) in neither the original nor
in the two amended pleadings in each of the three cases did
Appellant pray for the foreclosure of its whole lien by a
sale of all the property covered by its lien, and to which it
claimed to have furnished materials, and (2) the "bond
law" wasn't mentioned.
Sometime after the filing of the original Answer and
Counterclaim, some of the mechanics lien claimants (not
Appellant) made motions to the court for orders adding
D. Spencer Grow; D. Spencer Grow, dba Mid-Utah Construction Company and Radio Sales C<WPOration; Mortgage
Insurance Corporation; Grow Investment Corporation; and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company, a corporation, as Crossdefendants in each of the three cases. Over objection of
Respondent, the Trial Court granted the motion. However, neither Appellant nor any party to the appeals at bar
designated for inclusion in the record now before the Court
either the mortions referred to or the orders grtanting them,
and for all the record on this appeal shows, there are no
Cross-defendants in any of the actions. While we will make
some references to these "Cross-defendants" throughout
this brief and will :answer Appellant's arguments ooncerning them, we do not concede that ·any of them are properly
or legally before this HonoraJble Corurt according to the
record.
It should be noted at this point that the Notice of Lien
filed by Appellant and upon which it relies in the three
cases before the C'ourt (Def. Exhibit 29, Civil No. 20,575)
is a single or "blanket" lien claiming $18,653.67 on a total
of 101 buildings situated in O'rem and Provo in five separate areas, which prolperties were not owned by a common owner either at the time Appellant's Lien was filed,
or any other time. No designation is made as to the
amount claimed against the properties described in the
Notice of Lien either 1by lot, owner, or area.
The Trial Court found in each case that generally
the properties described in Appellant's Notice of Lien are
as follows: (R. 211, Civil No. 20,575, R. 69, Civil No. 20,591, and R. 99, Civil No. 20,592)
(a)

"All of Keyridge Heights, a subdivision,
owned by Cross-defendants at the times materials
were furnished by said Ludlow, consisting of 25 lots
on which have been constructed 23 homes by the said
Robert B. Mecham under contracts with the said owners.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(b) "All of Keyridge Heights, Plat "B", owned
by Cross-defendants at the time Defendant Ludlow
furnished materials to Defendant Mecham, consisting
of 35 lots on whieh have been constructed 35 homes
by Defendant Mecham under contract with said owners, of which all have been substantially completed
except 11 of said homes which are in various states
of completion.''
(c) "Twelve lots in the Schauerhamer area
owned by Defendant Robert B. Mecham at the time
of commencement of construction and on which 12
homes have been built by the Defendant Mecham, and
all of which are substantially completed."
I

"A parcel of land in

(d)

Pro~o,

Utah, at about

5th North between 15th and 16 West, consisting of
about 7.79 acres, divided into lots and owned by De~
fendant, Robert B. Mecham, upon which he has constructed one house as owner builder, but which said
house has not been completed.''
1

"Forty-four lots in La Mesa Subdivision
owned by Defendant Robert B. Mecham upon which
he .commenced construction of dwellings on 24 of said
lots and said dwellings are in various stages of completion from 45% to 90%". (Emphasis supplied)
(e)

Q

(f) "Four lots in Rowley area owned by Robert B. Mecham on which 4 homes were built by said
Mecham, but not fully, completed."

It will be noted from the foregoing that the majority
of the homes, some 58, on which Appellant claimed a lien
are in Keyridge Heights and Keyridge Heights Plat "B"
owned by three Cross-defendants. Neither these, the Provo property nor six of the twelve Sc.hauerhamer properties
are sought to be foreclosed by any of the parties to the actions before the Court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The finding of the Trial Court with respect to the 58
Keyridge homes is as follows:
"That commencing August 5, 1955 and continuing to the summer of 1956, Defendant Robert B. Mecham, at various times during said period entered into a total of 58 separate contracts with Cross-defendant Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company, a corporation,
and Cross-defendant D. Spencer Grow, whe,reby the
said Mecham was to build for the owners of said property 58 separate dwellings for a consideration stated
and agreed upon in each of said contracts; that the
said Mecham did fully complete 47 of said dwellings,
and the remaining 11 are substantially, but not fully,
completed; that the said Mecham has been paid for
said construction and all extras by the owners of said
land.''
The contracts, each covering a particular lot and stating a separate consideration, were~ received in evidence as
plaintiff's Exhibits 42 (1-58), Civil No. 20,575, 24 (1-58)
Civil No. 20,591, and 22 (1-58) Civil No. 20,592.
Because it appeared obvious from the pleadings that
Appellant was not seeking to foreclose its lien as against
all the property described in the Nortice of Lien, but was
claiming the total amount of the lien as against the 34
properties described in the three eases before the c:ourt,
Respondent's counsel, at the pre-trial hearing, sought an
explanation of Appellant's position. He was informed that
Appellant claimed the fuH amount of the lien against each
and every single property involved in the three cases before the Court. (Pr~trial hearing, Page 28-29)
The proof offered by Appellant at the trial in support
of its lien as against the 34 properties described in _Respondent's three Complaints was simply that commencing in June
I
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1956, and continuing to June 1957, Appellant furnished
plumbing materials first to Roger Allred who was working for Mecham, and later to Mecham, of the value of $42,423. 60 upon an open account, and that there was due and
owing by Mecham upon this account the sum of $18,653.67.
(Tr. 621-656). Appellant's witnesses were emphatic in
their inability to state the value o[ the matrials which went
into each property, or even the amounts which were used
or sold to be used in the separate areas liened. Although
AJppellant's testimony was also thart it knew that Keyridge
belonged to Mr. Grow,. and La Mesa belonged to Mecham,
(Tr. 626), Appellant either failed to keep any records as
to dates, quantities, or points of delivery as between the
areas, or if records were kept, for some reason refused to
introduce them in evidence. Appellant was not the sole
supplieT of plumbing materials. (Tr. 375)

In this connection, the Trial Court made findings in
each of the three cases as follows: (R. 215, Oivil No. 20,575, R. 73, Civil No. 20,591, R. 101, Civil No. 20,592)
(1)

"That during the period commencing June

1956 and continuing until June 1957, plumbing materials and supplies were sold to Defendant, Mecham, on
an open account, Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company,
and were not sold for use on any particular lot, property; or project, described in its Notice of Lien referred to in Paragraph 12 hereof, and were sold for
use by the Defendant Mecham in such manner and
for such use upon lots, properties or projects as Mecham should determine."

(2) "That during the period June 1956 to June
1957 Defendant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. delivered said plumbing materials and supplies from its
place of business in Salt l..;ake City, Utah, to Orem,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utah to the Defendant Mecham mostly by common
carrier . and such materials were delivered to Keyridge
subdivision and to the La Mesa Subdivision, and none
were delivered by Ludlow to the Schauerhamer, Rowley, or Provo areas."
Respondenrt does not challenge the above findings in
its brief.
The Trial Court made a further finding to the effect
that Appellant knew ·and understood that all of Keyridge
Subdivision was owned by some of the Cross-defendants,
and that all of La Mesa was owned by Defendant Mecham.
(R. 215, Civil No. 20,575, R. 73, Civil No. 20,591, R. 101102, Civil No. 20,592).
1

The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Appellant and against Defendant Robert B. Mecham for the to~
tal amount of its open account, (R. 244, Civil No. 20,575,
R. 80, Civil No. 20,591, R. 121, Civil No. 20,592), but held
that its purported lien was invalid and that the evidence
furnished no basis whereby the Court could apportion the
materials and supplies sold by Appellant to Mecham among
the numerous tracts of land covered by the lien. (R. 215,
Civil No. 20,575, R. 73, Civil No. 20,591, R. 102, Civil No.
20,592). It is from the judgment denying Appcllant a prior lien to Respondent's mortgages upon the properties described in Respondent's Complaints that Appellant makes
this appeal.
There is no dispute as to the amounts found by the
Trial Court to be due Respondent by Mecham on its mortgages or on the amount found to be due Appellant by Mecham on its open account. Neither Mecham nor his ·wife
has taken any appeal.
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It also does not appear thart there is any dispute as
to the facts found by the Trial Court that no work was actually commenced nor materials deliveTed on any property
in each of the three areas involved in the cases at bar until after all the mortgages in each of the areas had first
been recorded, (R. 210, Civil No. 20,575, R. 67, Civil No.
20,591, R. 98, Civil No. 20,592), except in the case of the
prope~ty described in Respondent's Sixth Cause of Action
in Civil No. 20,591. As to .that latter property only, the
mortgage sued upon, resulting from a refinancing transaction, was not recorded until June 26, 1957 (R. 67, Civil No.
20,591), and we concede that since work on that property
was eommenced prior to the recording of Respondent's
mortgage, any valid mechanic's lien as against that property for the value of any materials furnished "to be used"
upon that property would be prior in right to that mortgage.
Appellant has filed no supersedeas bond, and pursuant to Decrees in each of the three eases, all of the properties were sold by the Sheriff in separate parcels in accordance with the laws governing sales upon foreclosure. Respondent bid in each of the properties for a sum equal to
or less than the amounts found to be due on the mortgages.
There were no other bidders.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINI)ING AND
DETERMINING THAT THE LIEN OF APPELLANT IS
INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAIN·ST THE
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PROPERTIES D ESC R I BE D
COMPLAINTS.

IN

RESPONDENT'S

POINT II
THE COURT WAS C'ORRECT IN FINDING THAT
THE BUILDING OF HOUSES IN EACH O~F THE
AREAS CO,VERED BY THE LIEN OF APPELLANT
WAS NOT ONE ENTIRE PROJECT.
POINT III
THE ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
FIND THAT MID-UTAH BROADCASTING CO·MPANY
BECAME LIABLE TO APPE,LLANT FOR MATE.RIALS
FURNISHED TO THAT PROPERTY AFFECTED BY
CASE NO. 20,591 DE'SIGNATED AS S.CHAUERHAMER
AREA.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
FIND THAT ROBERT B. MEC~ TOOK TITLE TO
PROPERTIES DESIGNATED AS RO,WLEY AND LA
MES·A FOR AND ON BEHALF O~F RESPO,NDENT OR
THlAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS THE AGENT FOR
RESPONDENT, AND WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT IS
ENTITLEID TO PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST RESPONDENT IN CO,NNECTION WITH THE PROPERTY
SITUATED IN ROWLEY AND LA IVlESA AREAS BY
VIRTUE OF SECTION 14-2-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 1953. (Bond Law)
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POINT IV
'I'HE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
EQUALLY APPORTION APPELLANT'S LIEN.
POINT VI
RESPONDENT'S RECORDED MORTGAGES GAVE
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF CONTENTS, AS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS WERE FAIR ON THEIR FACES
AND REOORD TITLE HOLDER, ROBERT B. MECHAM, PROPERLY EXECUTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE SAME PRIOR TO RECORDING.
POINT VII
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTO~PPED TO CLAIM
PRIORITY OF ITS MORTGAGES.
POINT VIII
APPELLANT HAS NO VALID AND ENFORCEABLE LIEN AGAINST THE PRO·PERTIES INVOLVED,
BECAUSE ITS MATERIALS WERE SOLD UPON AN
OPEN ACCOUNT IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
TRADE.
POINT IX
IF MECHANIC'S LIENS IN FAVOIR OF APPELLANT ARE DETERMINED TO BE VALID IN SOME
ASCERTAINABLE AMOUNTS AGAINST THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED, THE MORTGAGES OF RESPONDENT WOULD IN ANY SUCH EVENT BE PRIOR IN RIGHT TO SUCH LIENS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND
DETERMINING THAT THE LIEN OF APPELLANT IS
INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST THE
PROPERTIES D E S C R I BE D IN RESPO,NDENT'S
CO·MPLAINTS.
Omiting immaterial wording, Section 38-1-3 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, pro~des as follows:
". . . all persons . . . furnishing materials to be
used in the construction . . . of any building, structure or improvement upon land . . . shall have a lien
upon the property upon or ~concerning which they have
. . . furnished materials . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 38-1-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:
"Liens against two or more buildings, mining claims
or other impro~ements owned by the same person or
persons may be included in one claim; but in such ease
the person filing the claim must designate therein the
amount claimed to be due him on each of such buildings, mining claims or orther improvements." (Emphasis supplied)
It is Respondent's position that Appellant's lien is fatally defective under the above statutes since its Notice of
Lien includes se·veral properties in five separate areas, all
of which were not owned by the same person or persons,
and there is no evidence in support of it upon which a determination can be made as to the value of the materials
furnished "to be used" or actually used "in the constructSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion" on any or all of the 34 separate lots foreclosed in the
three actions before the Court.
In the absence of any statute such as Section 38-1-8,
quoted above, aUJthorizing blanket liens, Jones on Liens,
Volume II at page 337 states the rule as follows:
''Where houses were built upon distinct lots of
land, a sepamte lien must generally be filed against
each house and lot for the work and materials used
thereon. A single lien against the entire premises for
the aggregate charge is invalid. It is immaterial that
at the time of the contract all of the houses and lots
belonged to the same owner, and that in a suit to foreclose the lien, he is the sole Defendant; and it is also
immaterial that the lots are contiguous and in a compact body of land and are without division fences. Nor
does it aid the lien in such case that the whole work
is done under one contract for all the buildings."
Where there is a statute similar to Section 38-1-8, it
then appears that a blanket lien may be filed on two or
more properties which are owned by the same owner if the
materials are furnished by a lien claimant under one single
contract. See 36 Am. Jur. 116; 10 A.L.R. 1026; 75 A.L.R
1328. Even then the majority rule is that the lots must
be contiguous. 10 A.L.R. 1033.
In the case of Eccles Lumber Co. vs. Martin, 31 Utah
241, 87 P. 713, ct;his Court held that a blanket lien on more
than one lot owned by the same person was not invalid
under Section 38-1-8 UCA because it failed to state in the
notice the amount claimed on each lot. The rationale of
that case was that since the property was under one ownershop it would make no difference to the owner, and the lien
was determined to be good as against a demurrer. How-
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ever, the Court also said that the effect of not designating
the amount claimed in the notice was to postpone the lien
to the claims of all other lienhoJders who did designate,
and we assume that this would include the Respondent in
the cases at bar which did, by its separate mortgages, "designate" the amount claimed against each property.
In none of the many cases annortated in the A.L.R
notes referred to above, and in no case cited by Appellant
or which we have been able to discover, has a single blanket lien covering property owned in severalty, as in this
case, been allorwed.
If the Eccles case doctrine were to be expanded to
allow a single blanket lien against several parcels of property owned by more than one owner, especially where there
is no designation in the notice as to the amount claimed
against each parcel or as against each orwner and no proof
as to the value of the materials furnished "to be ·USed" upon
or actually used in each pwcel, then, in our opinion, both
Sections 38-1-3 and 38-1-8, would be nullified and rendered
meaningless, and would open a Pandora's box of insoJuab~e
legal and practical problems and uncertainties in the field
of construction financing.
Perhaps the most cogent reason why Appellant's Lien
is unenforceable against the 34 properties involved in this
appeal is that in the actions before the C'ourt Appellant
seeks foreclosure of its lien against the 34 properties covered by Respondent's mortgage only, and not as against
the 101 properties covered by its lien. The weight of authority is to the effect that a single mechanics lien against
more than one parcel of land may not be enforced against
less than the whole of the property Hened, unless it is first
shown what part of the entire lien properly may be alloSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cated to the portion against which enforcement is sought.
Weaver vs. Harland Corp., 10 SE (2) 547, 130 A.L.R 417,
and Annotation following.
The record in the three cases before the Court contains nQ evidence as to the proportion of Appellant's total
lien which could be allocated to eithe~ the 24, 6 or 4 lots
involved in the three eases.
In support of its contention as to the validity of its
lien, Appellant cites the cases of Badger Lumber Company
vs. Holmes, 62 NW 446; Sarginson vs. Turner, 124 P. 379;
U. S. Building and Loan vs. Midvale Home Finance Corporation, 86 Utah 506, 44 P. (2) 1090; Brannan Sand and
Gravel Company vs. Santa Fe Land Company, 332 P. (2)
892, and some others, none of which, in our opinion, actually stand for the proposition contended for, and are not
contrary to any of the views expressed in this brief.
The Badger Lumber Company case does not help Appellant in any respect, and in fact is authority for Respondent's contention that a mechanic's lien cannot he enforced
against less than the property liened unless it is first shown
what part of the entire lien may properly be allocated to
the portion against which enforcement is sought. The
Court said in that case:
"If it is sought to charge a part only or the lots

for material furnished under the contract, then the
amounrt of the material furnished must be apportioned
so that the part charged shall bear no greater amount
of the expense th·an the value of the materials actually used on said parts in the construction of improvements made thereon." (Emphasis ours)
This decision was based upon a previous case, Byrd
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vs. Cochran, 39 Nebraska 109, 58 NW 127, wherein it was
held that:
"In order to recover upon a mechanics Lien filed
against one of the houses and the lot upon which it
stands, it must be shown that the amount charged
one house and lot is of the value of the labor performed
upon and materials furnished for such house, or an
estimate made by some method or plan which will
produce a ce·rtain definite result, and mere approximation or guesswork ~ill not suffice to establish a
lien." (Emphasis ours)
In the case of Sarginson vs. Turner, supra, the Court
held exactly contrary to Appellant's contention and supports Respondent's position with respect to this point. The
decision, including the statement of facts, is three paragraphs in length, the thi~rd of which reads as follows:
"It appears from the record thart: appellant by one
written instrument contracted with Gregg for the construction of five dwelling hou·ses, one to be built on
a lot belonging to a third party, in which the Respondent Turner Investment Company had no interest. It
further appears that Appellant did not keep separate
aocounts with these several buildings for labor and material furnished in their construction; that, without
separation or segregation, he now asserts one lien on
all four houses built on the lots of the Turner Investment Company, for the sum remaining due on the entire contract. This cannot be done, and, if no other
reason existed, Appellant's alleged lien would fail for
the want of segregation of accounts against each property." (Emphasis ours)
In the Brannan case the lien claimant fHed a notice of
lien against one of three properties owned by three sepaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rate owners, and sought foTeclosure of the lien against the
one property for the full amount of the claim attributable
to all three proerties. The claim was made under a contract "to surface and pave a 1567 foot roadway." The
paved area was on and traversed the three separate pieces
of prope~y. The Coill't held that the one property liened
cotrld not be charged with the full amount expended upon
all threer but that sin~ce the cost of the roadway could be
easily ealculated on a square foot basis, (the case actually
indicates that the amount was stipulated to), the amount
attributable to the property liened could be easily ascertained, and it was proper to allow a lien for the part of the
tortal attributable to that single property.
In construing a statute similar to ours, Section 38-1-3
hereinbefore set forth, that Corurrt said on Page 894:
"In the express words of the statute, containing,

as we believe, no ambiguity, there are two limitations
on the lien involved. First, it is granted only upon
the propevty upon which the labor, services and materia[ are bestowed or rendered; second, only to the
extent of the value of the labor, services and material
rendered upon the propertY . . . . . '' (Emphasis, the
Court's)
The Court quoted Johnson vs. Bennett, 40 P. 847, 848,
, in part as follows:
"By statute . . . the lien is restricted to the land
of the contracting mvner, or his interest in it, at the
time of making the contract, and is further restricted
to the work done 'upon such land' . . . (Emphasis,
the Court's)
And, tJhen said:
" . . . By statute, therefore, the inquiry of the
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Trial Court was limited to determining what labor,
service, and material were rendered by Plaintiff to the
property upon which the lien was claimed . . . "
A close reading of this case does not appear to us to
support Appellant's contention in any respect.
The case of U.S. Building and Loan vs. Midvale Home
Finance Corporation, supra, involved a single subdivision,
and lien claimants who furnished mate~rials for the entire
subdivision. Foreclosure was sought on the single mortgage, and this Court held that the mechanics liens were
prior to the mortgage because work on the subdivision had
commenced prior to the recording of the mortgage, and
that the mechanics Hens were not invalid because the notice failed to state separately the amount and value of
materials and labor furnished to eHJOh lot in the subdivision.
It appears to us that the Midvale case is correct on
its facts, but is not authority for Appellant's position that
a blanket lien covering 101 properties in five dis.t~nct and
non-contiguous areas, owned by ,more than one owner at
all times both before and after work eommenced on the
first property, can be enforced as against 34 orf those properties, without a scintilla of evidence as to the amount or
value of mate~rials either furnished "to be used" or actually used upon the 34 properties or any of them. Add the
further facts in the case at bar that Respondent sought
foreclosure of 34 separate mortgages covering 34 separate
properties in three separate cases, that there were and
are mechanics lien claimants and others who claim as
against separate areas and separate properties in those
areas, and who furnished identical or similar materials,
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and it seems apparent that the Midvale case is really not
in point.
POINT IT
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT
THE BUILDING OF :HOUSES IN EACH OF THE
AREAS COVERED BY THE LIEN O·F APPELLANT
WAS NOT ONE ENTIRE PROJECT.
If, in fact, the building of 101 houses in the five areas
covered by Appellant's lien was a single project, and Appellant bona fidely so regarded it, then it would appear to
us that Appellant ·would have sought foreclosure of its
whole lien and not merely a portion thereof on the 34
properties covered by Respondent's 34 mortgages in the
three cases before the Court. Had that been done, then
the single project theory might logically have been advanced and issue thereon properly joined.
But appellant did not choose to raise this matter
either by its pleadings or by its inclusion in the Pre-trial
order, and is, therefore, precluded from raising it on this
appeal.
Be that as it may, however, the Findings of Fact of
the Trial Court based upon the undisputed testimony in
the record and unchallenged by Appellant in its brief, are
dead oppo·sed to that theory insofar as the rights of Respondent are concerned. Bearing upon this matter, the
Trial Court, in all three eases, found the facts substantially
as rollows: (R. 212-214, Civil No. 20,575 ,R. 70-72, Civil
No. 20,591, R. 99 A-101, Civil No. 20,592)
''That the property known as Keyridge Heights
and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" was acquired in three
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separate parcels commencing in 1955 and continuing
in 1956 by three Cross-defendants.''
"Thalt 10 of the lots in the Schauerhamer area
were acquired by Defendant Robert B. Mecham from
D. Reuben Schauerhamer in the fall of 1955 after the
said Mecham commenced construction of homes in
l{eyridge Heights under eontracts with some of the
Cross-defendants, and the -consideration paid by Mecham for said lots was the rebuilding of a house for
D. Reuben Schauerhamer, all of which was unknown
to Plaintiff or any of its office,rs or agents or any of
the Cross-defendants, prior to the summer of 1956,
when Cvoss-defendant D. Spencer Grow, discovered
Mecham to be building five homes thereon.
"That the other two of said lots in the Schauerharner area were acquired by the Defendant Robert
B. Mecham from William Henry Baldwin and Max R.
Brown for substantial cash considerations, prior to the
commeneement of any construction thereon, which
acquisitions were unknown to Plaintiff or any of its
officers or agents or any of the Cross-defendants.''
"That Defendant Robert B. Mecham purchased
the Provo property from Kenneth Allred in J·une, 1956,
for about $5,000.00 and sometime thereafter, as owner builder, commenced to build a home thereon, all
without the knowledge of Plalintiff or any of its officers or agents or any of the Cross-defendants.''
''That the four Rowley lots were acquired by
Robert B. Mecham from Maude G. Rowley, Don E.
Rowley, Laure J. Rowley, by Warranty Deed dated
January 15, 1957, for a cash consideration which Defendant Mecham paid.''
''That the La Mesa property was acquired by
Robert B. Mecham from Maude G. Rowley, Don E.
Rowley, Laura J. Rowley, Norman J. Rowley, and
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Judith Kay Rowley, by Warranty Deed dated January
29, 1957, for approximately $30,000.00 of which about
$20,000.00 has been paid by said Mecham."
"That commencing August 5, 1955 and continuing to the summer of 1956, Defendant Robert B. Me·
cham, at various times during said period entered into a total of 58 separate contrn.cts with Cross-defendants Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company and Cross-defendant Grow Investment Company, a corporation,
and Cross-defendant D·. Spencer Grow, whereby the
said Mecham was to build for the owners of said property 58 separate dwellings for a considemtion stated
and agreed upon in each of said contracts; that the
said Mecham did fully complete 47 of said dwellings
and the remaining 11 are substantially, but not fully,
completed; that the said Mecham has been paid for
said construction and all extras by the owners of said
land.''
"That in the summer of 1956, without the lmowledge or consent of Plaintiff or any of its officers or
agents and without the knowledge or consent of any
of the Cross-defendants, Defendant Mecham commenced the construction of a dwelling on the Provo
property as owner builder, which dwelling has been
substantially completed."
"That on December 14, 1956 after the recording
of seven separate mortgages thereon in favor of Plaintiff, fue Defendant Mecham, as owner-builder, commenced construction on an additional seven dwellings
on lots in the Schauerhamer area."
"That on or about February 1, 1957, after the recording of four separate mortgages thereon in f.avor
of the Plaintiff, Defendan1t Mecham, as owner builder,
commenced construction of 4 dwellings on the four
Rowley lots."
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"That on February 21, 1957, and after the recording of 24 separate mortgages thereon, Defendant Mecham as owner builder commenced the .construction
of 24 dwellings on 24 lots in the La Mesa subdivision.
''That during the period August 1955 to June
1957, Defendant Mecham was engaged in a general
building and contracting business and did work and
furnished materials and labor in connection with other
building, including the construction of a home for Wes
Parks, a house whieh was being sold by a Ward of
the L.D.S. Church, and work and laJbor on a Bishop's
Storehouse, and constructed a masonry building on his
own property; that the suppliers for these endeavors
were generally the same as those involved in this action (20,575) and in Civil Numbers 20,591, and 20,592."
As appears from the foregoing, the property covered
by ~ppellant's lien was acquired piecemeal by different
owners over a period of more than one and a half years,
the Keyridge contracts were entered into separately at
different times over a period of ne~arly a year, the mortgages placed upon the property involved in this lawsuit
were executed art different times, and at no time can it be
said that ~the total construction which Mecham did and
which was covered by Appellant's lien was within the contemplation of any of the parties, including Appellant, Respondent, and Mecham. Add to this the further f:act that
the properties were widely scattered in five separate and
distinct areas in two towns, and we think that under no
circumstances can it be considered that the building wh~ch
Mecham did on all the properties covered by AppeHant's
lien was a single project.
The reason for Appellant raising this issue is not clear
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from its brief, but apparently the theory is ·that if construction on all the properties covered by the lien were
considered to be a single pro~oot, rthen it could claim the
construction commencement date on the first house in Keyridge as the construction commencement date of all of the
homes involved in the three !Cases before the Court, and,
therefore, its lien would be prior to the mortgages in these
cases. The law will not support this theory. As the Kansas Court said in the case of Security Stove Manufacturing Company vs. Sellards, 3 P. (2) 481:
"This theory is inconsistent with the attitude of
all parties to the case all the way through, including
the lienholders. Their claims and their judgments
were separate and distinct as to the two lots \vhen they
should have put them together as one claim and one
judgment, if they expected to consideT their lien as
only one on barth ~lots, to take advantage of the earlier
commencement of work on the other lot. No authorities are eited to support this theory, and we are not
inclined to accept it as applicable to the facts in this
case.''
See also 57 C.J.S. 756, which reads as follows:
"Where mechanics and materialmen maintain and
enfiorce their lien sepamtely on two lots belonging to
the same person, on which buildings are being constructed at the same time, they cannot on one lot claim
the advantage of the earlier commencement of the
building on the other."
It requires no i~magination to perceive the inherent diffi~culties in home financing if the law were otherwise. For
how could a lender or a purehaser ever be sure that lien
rights had expired even though a particular home may

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2!5
have been completed and occupied for months or even
years?
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
FIND THAT MID-UTAH BROADCASTING COMPANY
BECAME LIABLE TO APPELLANT FOR MATE.RIALS
FURNISHED TO THAT PROPERTY AFFECTED BY
CASE NO. 20,591 DESIGNATED AS SCHAUERHAMER
AREA.
We are unable to understand Appellant's point No. III.
It is assumed, however, that it is referring in that point
to some one or more of six Schauerhamer lots not involved
in any of the three cases before the Court, and is asserting
that one of the Cross-defendants, Mid-Utah Broadcasting
Company, is liable to Appellant for materials furnished to
Mecham and used upon some one or more orf those six lots..
This liability is predicated on the "bond law" and a claimed
agency relationship between Cross-defendants and Defendant, Robert B. Mecham.
If our assumption is correct, then the "bond law" liability assertion, not having been pleaded and not having
been reserved as an issue in the pre-trial order, is brandnew to this law suit and has no application to the foreclosure of the mortgages involved in the three actions before the Court.
The agency proposition vvas rejected by the Tri:al Court
in both a specific finding of fact and conclusion of law in
all three cases now before the Court, (R. 217, 222, Civil
20,575; R. 73, 75, Civil 20,591; R. 102, 105, Civil 20,592)
and there is no evidence in the record which affirmatively
establishes any agency relationship whatsoever. In this
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connection the Trial Court found as a fact in Civil No. 20,591 and also in the other two eases, and Appellant makes
no citation in its brief to any part of the record justifying
a finding to the eontrary:
"That Robert B. Mecham was never appointed or
held out as an agent of D. Spencer Grow, the Plaintiff, or any of the -corporate Cross-defendants."
And as a Conclusion of Law, the Court found:
"That Defendant Robert B. Mecham was not the
agent of Plaintiff or agent of Cross-defendants or any
of them."
In any event, the record in the eases now before the
c·ourt contains no evidence whatsoever which would establish or tend to establish a elaim for any particular amount
on account of ·any of Appellant's materials which might
have been used in or upon properties in the Schauerhamer
area. About all the evidence there is as to the use of rnaterials in the Schauerhamer area appears on page 18 of
Appellant's brief wherein he quotes the testimony of Robera B. Mecham as follows:
Question: Were materials delivered from La Mesa
area-that is, plumbing materials to the Schauerharner area?
Answer:

In some rare occasions they were.

This testimony would not support a judgment under
the "bond la\v" for any certain amount against Mid-Utah
Broadcasting Company on account of materials furnished
or claimed to be furnished in the Schauerhamer area.
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POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
FIND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM TO,OK TITLE TO
PROPER.TIES DESIGNATED AS ROWLEY AND LA
MESA FOR AND ON BEHALF O~F RESPO,NDENT OR
THlAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS THE AGENT FOR
RESPONDENT, AND WAS CO,RRECT IN REFUSING
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT IS
ENTITLEID TO PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST RESPONDENT IN CO,NNECTION WITH THE PRO~PERTY
SITUATED IN ROWLEY AND LA MESA AREAS BY
VIRTUE O,F SECTION 14-2-2 UTAH CO·DE ANNOTATED, 1953. (Bond Law)
In Appellant'~s brief on this point several statements
are made both directly and inferentially to the effect that
the evidence established that Mecham was "instructed by
Grow as agent of Respondent to take title in 'his (Mecham's) name and that Respondent would furnish the
money", and that Respondent was "the real party in interest", thereby inferring that Meoham was Respondent's
agent. There is no reference in Appellant's brief as to
where this evidence appears in the record, and such statements or inferences are bald conclusions without basis in
fact and without consideration of Respondent's testimony.
(Tr. 714-772).
In several days of testimony, neither Mecham nor any
other witness clai,med that Mecham purchased either of the
two properties mentioned in Appellant's Point IV for Mr.
Grow or for anyone but himself, and in over 30 depositions
and 20 days of trial, not one witness claimed that Mecham
was held out to anyone by Mr. Grow or by Mecham himSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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self as an agent of Respondent or as an agent of Mr. Grow
or any of the Cross-defendants.
Appellant's testimony with reference to the ownership
of the La Mesa and Rowley properties was that it knew
Keyridge belonged to Grow and La Mesa to Mecham. (Tr.
629). Mr. Grow categorically stated that he had nothing
to do with the negotiations for and purchase of the four
Rowley lots and did not instruct or otherwise counsel Mecham to purchase that ground. (Tr. 732). He testified
precisely tJhe same with regqrd to La Mesa, (Tr. 732), and
said he did not know of the purchase of either of the
properties until sometime after Mecham had made his own
arrangements with the sellers. (Tr. 734).
Don Rowley, with whom Mecham had his negotiations for the purchase of the Rowley and La Mesa properties, and one of the Grantors in the deeds of those
properties to Mecham, (Plf's. Exhibits 128 and 129 Civil
No. 20,575) said that he was building in the general area
of those properties when Mecham came by and asked him
if he knew of any land available in that area. (Tr. 826).
Rowley further said that Mecham told him that he (Mecham) had been building homes in the Schauerhamer
area "on his own" and that is what he was going to do
with the Rowley and La Mesa properties. (Tr. 828).
As heretofore pointed out, the Trial Court found both
as a Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law that Mecham
was not the agent of Respondent or any of the Cross-defendants, and we submit that there is no evidence in the
record which would support a contrary finding.
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POINT V
THE CO,URT DID NOT E.RR IN REFUSING TO
EQUALLY APPORTION APPELLANT'S LIEN.
It is our position that in a proper case equal apportionment of a lien might be made, particularly where one
supplier furnishes all of orne type of ~material for a group
of houses under one ownership, which materials are used
indiscriminately therein, and where it might be presumed
that approximately equal value was used in or upon each
house in the group. We believe also that a lien might be
apportioned, though not necessarily equally, in a situation
such as occurred in the Brannan case, (supra), where the
amount attributable to the parcel liened can be readily calculated or is stipulated to by ,fue parties.
In the case at bar, however, Appellant contends under his Point V that an ~apportionment, which it refused
to consider at any time during the pre-trial or trial and
did nort plead, should have been made on an equal basis
among 52 of the properties on which Mecham built houses,
although his lien covered 101 improved properties and
these actions involved only 34. Just horw the 52 figure is
arrived at is not clear from Appellant's brief on this point,
but if any apportionment were proper it would have to be
on the total properties liened and not on the arbitrary figure of 52.
1

It is Respondent's position, however, that no legal,
equitable, or logical basis for an equal apportionment of
Appellant's total lien among the 101 properties, or :among
the 5 separate areas, or as between 58 Keyridge properties
and the others, is shown by the evidence, and the Court
was correct in so holding.
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There is no evidence in the record as to the value of
materials furnished by Appellant "to be used" in or upon
or actually used in or upon any one or group of the 34
properties involved in the three actions before the Court.
There is no evidence in the record that Appellant furnished
any materials "to be used" in the Schauerhamer or Rowley areas, as it did not deliver to those properties and did
not even know of the existence of those areas until construction ceased in June, 1H57. (Tr. 651, -652). The only
evidence that any materials were actually used in those
areas is Mecham's testimony quoted on page 18 of Appellant's brief wherein Mecham said that "on some rare occasions" materials were delivered from La Mesa to Schauerharner, and "some" were delivered from the La Mesa area
to the Rowley area. Upon that evidence it would appear
to us that any kind of a logical or reasonable apportionment o[ .A:ppellant's lien would be impossible, especially,
since other suppliers furnished to Mecham the same type
of materials.
(See Plf's Exhibit 125, Civil No. 20,575,
wherein it appears that Peerless Utah soJd plumbing supplies to Mecham in the am·ount of $13,560.23 from November 10, 1955 through April 25, 1957. Utah Plumbing Supply also furnished plumbing materials and was made a
party Defendant in the La Mesa action.)
As is said in Jones on Liens, Volume 2, Section 1319,
cited by Appellant on page 24 of his brief:
''In ·an action to enforce a lien for labor performed
on two houses, the fact that the petitioner is not able
to state the precise share of the labor performed on
each house does not necessarily defeat his lien against
each house for such certain amounts of lcubor as they
are satisfied he performed thereon, alth<>Ug1h they
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may not be satisfied that he did not perform more."
(Emphasis ours)
What "certain" amounts of materials could the Court
be "satisfied" were furnished to be used upon any or all
of the properties upon which foreclosure was sought by
Appellant and Respondent in the cases at bar? What reasonable basis is there in Appellant's evidence to justify an
assumption that either 1/52 or ljlOlth of the total amount
of Appellant's materials were furnished "to be used" upon
the single properties separately foreclosed in the cases before the Court?
POINT VI
RESPONDENT'S RECORDED MORTGAGES GAVE
CONSTRU·CTIVE NOTICE OF CONTENTS, AS ACKNOWLEDGME.NTS WERE FAIR ON THEIR FACES
AND RECORD TITLE HOLDER, RO~BERT B. MECHAM, PROPERLY EXECUTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE SAME PRIOR TO RECORDING.
Appellant makes a point in its brief of the fact that
Ruth W. Mecham, wife of Robert B. Mecham, did not personally appear at the office of Respondent on all occasions
when she signed the mortgages. It is asserted that because some of the mortgages were signed by her away from
the presence of the Notary Public and her acknowledgements as to those were taken by telephone, that all the
mortgages involved in the cases at bar gave no constructive notice to Appellant, and ·hence Appellant's lien is prior
in right.
For that argument to be of any benefit to .A!ppellant
in the cases at bar, the Court must first reverse the Trial
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Court's holding that Appellant has no enforceable lien, and
fix the amount thereof as against the properties sought to
be foreclosed in these actions, and second, must conclude
that the Appellant had no actual knowledge of the existence of the mortgages.
As we have heretofore pointed out and as the Trial
Court held, no enforceable lien exists, and hence, whether
or not the mortgages gave constructive notice to Appellant, would be immaterial. Appellant admits in its brief
that the mortgages were valid as between the parties and
neither of the Mortgagors ever claimed differently. The
Utah case o[ Mitchel vs. Palmer, 240 P. (2) 970, 121 Utah
245, would seem to be decisive on that point. The Court
held in that case that a deed need not be acknowledged in
order to be valid as between the parties thereto.
On the matter of whether Appellant had actual knowledge of the existence of the mortgages, see the testimony
of Appellant's witness, Jay D. Knudsen, commencing on
Page 649 of the transcript wherein he insisted that he
knew as a matter of common knowledge that there were
mortgages on the property. Section 38-1-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, dealing with the priority of mechanic's
liens over other encumbrances, makes such liens prior in
right to a mortgage "of which the lienholder had no notice," .and, therefore, if Appellant says that the existence
of the mortgages was a matter of common knowledge, it
knew of the existence of the mortgages and it would make
no difference whether the recorded mortgages imparted
constructive notice or not.
In any event, it is our position that the mortgages involved in these cases did impart constructive notice to Ap-
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pellant and all others \Vho dealt with or concerning the
property, as will hereinafter appear.
The evidence shows clearly that all of the thirty-four
mortgages involved in the three proceedings before the
Court were executed and acknowledged by Robert B. Mecham at the office of Respondent and in the presence of
the Notaries Public who took his acknowledgements. (Tr.
839, 847). The record further shows that at the time of
execution of said mortgages, the record title to the property covered by the mortgages was in the name of Robert B. Mecham (Def. Exhibits 128 and 129, Civil No. 20,575) and 'hence, the mortgages were in all respects proper
and adequate so far as his execution and acknowledgements as record title holder are concerned.
At the time of signing the mortgages, Mrs. Mecham
had only an inchoate statutory interest in the property,
whieh might or might not ripen into ownership rights, dependent upon her survivorship of her husband, Robert B.
Mecham. At no time in the proceedings did she, as a
party defendant, deny the execution of said mortgages.
She further, by telephone, acknowledged the execution
thereof to a Notary Public who was employed at the office of Respondent. (Tr. 841). As a result of the foreclosure proceedings in the District Court, in whieh she
was a party defendant, all of her inchoate right, title and
interest in and to the properties was foreclosed. The
sheriff's sale has been completed and a deed issued conveying to Respondent all interest which she might have
acquired under her statutory right. She has taken no appeal.
A reading of the Utah statutes makes it clear that every prerequisite as to the acknowledgement prior to reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cording, in so far as the same relates to Robert B. Mecham,
has been met. If Mrs. Mecham had not signed the mortgages, nevertheless the same would have been adequate
to give constructive notice of the existence thereof with
merely the signature of Robert B. Mecham, which was duly acknowledged. The addition of her name thereon did
not in any manner detract from the validity of the mortgages and their recording so as to give constructive notice
otf the execution by the record title holder.
Now let us analyze the question raised (which actually is immaterial in light of the validity of the acknowledgement as to the record title owner, Robert B. Mecham)
and the cases which have been cited by Appellant regarding the telephonic acknowledement by Mrs. Mecham. Not
all of Mrs. Mecham's acknowledgements were by telephone,
as it is admitted that she personally appeared at the office of Respondent and signed one group of mortgages.
(Tr. 840, 848). As the mortgages on La Mesa were executed in groups of eight, we can safely assume that at least
eight of the mortgages were signed by her and acknowledged in the presence otf a Notary Public. None of the
evidence identifies which mortgages were personally acknowledged by her as compared with those which were
acknowledged by telephone. In view otf the fact that the
burden of proof is on the Appellant to upset the validity
of the acknowledgements, we feel that it has failed in its
burden of proof to identify the particular mortgages.
Now, assuming that the mortgages which were acknowledged by Mrs. Mecham in response to the telephone
inquiry of the Notary Public could be identified, do those
mortgages impart constructive notice to subsequent encumbrancers as to her? We notice that Appellant's brief
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refers to certain cases in which that issue was considered.
The ~primary case cited is Myers vs. Ebey, 33 ldaho, 266,
193 P. 77. In that matter the Idaho statute involved was
different from our Utah statute in that it dealt specifically
with a personal acknowledgement by a wife as to property claimed to be a homestead of the parties, and prescribed
that in the absence of such, the document would be void.
This is very dissimilar to our statute, which does not make
a defectively acknowledged instrument void. No homestead properties are involved either, as these are all lots
upon which houses were built by Mecham for resale. 'f.he
Meohams resided on remote and different property and no
declaration of homestead has been filed on any land involved in these three cases.
No criticism has been made as to the form of the acknowledgement, and if any defect appears, such is a result
of extraneous evidence. The general law relating to the
right of such a document to recordation and the effect of
giving constructive notice therby is stated in 1 CJS 799
under the heading of "Acknowledgements" to be:
"Where 1Jhe acknowledgement is regular on its
face so that it becomes the duty of the recording officer to admit the instrument to record, its record will
afford constructive notice, although there are latent
or hidden defects in the acknowledgement, as, for example, where it was taken before an interested party
or an executor, or a stockholder, or was taken outside
the proper county."
The Utah case of Tarpey vs. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah
205, 14 P. 338 is clearly distinguishable. In that ease the
instrument had been properly acknowledged, but was not
witnessed as was then required by statute, and the ommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion was apparent on the face of the instrument. See annotation 59 A.L.R. (2d) 1316; 1 Am. Jur. 228.
In Utah, the law has been established that one who
asserts the invalidity of a deed or other document involving real proerty must prove such invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence. The acknowledgement and recordation of the document gives rise to a presumption of its
genuineness, due execution and delivery thereof, and is prima facie evtdence. These presumptions arising from acknowledgement and recordation, should be given great
weight and should not be overthrown by a mere preponderance of evidence, but only by clear and convincing proof.
See Northcrest, Inc. vs. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.
(2d) 692; 122 Utah 268. This rule has also been declared
in other Utah cases which are cited in the one noted above.
The lower court in the instant case has not found that
the acknowledgement of Mrs. Mecham was defective, nor
has the lorwer court found that the mortgages were not entitled to recordation, nor has the court found that constructive notice was nort given by the presence of said documents on the official records in the office of the Utah County Recorder. We believe that Appellant not only has failed
to support its legal theories by authority, but also has
failed to show that there is in the record clear and convincing proof that some identifiable mortgages are invalid
for any purpose.
POINT VII
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO CLAIM
PRIORITY OF ITS MORTGAGES.
The argument of Appellant in its brief on Point VII
cites no authority and makes no reference to the transcript
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or record wherein the "facts" allegedly creating an estoppel
appear or are found, except in one instance. Furthermore,
the argument is predicated upon the assumption that Appellant has a valid and enforceable lien in some ascertainable amount or amounts against the properties involved in
the cases at bar, and which lien, though legally inferior to
Respondent's mortgages, is nevertheless entitled to priority by reason of certain acts and conduct of Respondent's agent amounting to an estoppeL
We do not agree with Appellant's contentions for several reasons.
First, the lien of Appellant is unenforceable as against
the properties because it is invalid under the law, and because there is no evidence as to the value of materials creating a lien which were fwnished "to be used" or actually
used upon the properties in the cases at bar. Therefore,
even if Respondent was estopped to assert priority of its
mortgages, whi1ch we strongly deny, there is still no enforceable "liens" on the properties in any ascertainable
amounts in favor of Appellant. (See Respondent's argument under Point I and authorities cited therein). To illustrate this point, we respectfully call the Court's attention
to Respondent's Sixth Cause of Action in Civil No. 20,591,
involving the Schauerhamer property, wherein the mortgage therein sought to be foreclosed, resulting from a refinancing transaction, is dated June 14, 1957 and was recorded June 26, 1957. (R. 67). There is no question, and
we have always ·conceded, that on that single lot work was
commenced prior to the recording of the mortgage thereon and, therefore, any "liens" affecting that property are
prior in right to that mortgage. The question, then, is:
does Appellant have a lien upon this property, and if so
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what is the amount? Is there any evidence in the record
that any of Appellant's materials were! furnished "to be
used" in or actually used upon this property exeept the
testimony of Mecham that upon "some rare occasions"
materials were taken from La Mesa and used upon Schauerharner? In our opinion, Whether Appellant is estopped
or not es~topped to elaim priority of its mortgages over AppeHant's lien is beside the point, because Appellant failed
in its burden to establish any lien at all.
Second, the facts upon which an "estoppel" is claimed
are not facts found by the Trial C'ourt and for the most
part are assertions unsupported by the evidence. For example, on the question as to whether Mecham was losing
money in Keyridge see Mecham's testimony commencing
at page 168 of the Transcript and Defendant's Exhibit 443,
Civil No. 20,575, wherein he admitted that he had no records kept exeept the Exhibit referred to, or any records of
calculations, and apparently was basing his estimate of losses upon a gener-al assumption that the type of house which
he was building could not have been built for the contract
price. In eontrast to this testimony see the testimony of
William R. Jex, a witness originally called by one of the
lien claimants as an e~ert in the building of homes in and
about Utah County. Mr. Jex stated exactly what in his
opinion it would cost to build the homes which Mecham
built in the Keyridge area, and in practically every instan~ce the amount which Mr. Jex estimated as the cost of
building each house was less than the contract price and
included a ten per cent profit for the contractor. (Tr. 815819; see also Plfs. Ex:hibits 42 (1-58) Civil No. 20,575 and
Plfs. Exhibits 56 1-147) consisting of cancelled checks pay-
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able to Mecham by Cross-defendants totalling in
the contract prices).

ex~cess

of

Even Mecham himself never claimed that he was the
agent for Mr. Grow, as contended by Appellant, or that
he purchased any property for and on behalf of Respondent or Mr. Grow or any of the Cross-defendants. Don Rowley, from whom Mecham bought the Rorwley and LaMesa
properties, in his testimony said that Mecham told him he
had been building homes for Grow or Utah Savings and
then had gone into the Schauerhamer area on his own,
and that was what he was going to do with the Rowley
and La Mesa properties. (Tr. 827,828).
Mr. D. Spencer Grow said in his testimony commenc'
ing on page 721 that he asked Mecham
to get him a cost
estimate and pursuant to that request a cost estimate was
furnished to hi~m on which the prices of the Keyridge properties were negotiated. He further said on page 731 that
Mecham told him that some people by the name of Rowley owned some acreage located just east of Crystal Acres,
that he (Mecham) could purchase and give back a mortgage, and out of the proceeds orf the sale of homes, could
pay off the mortgage. (Tr. 731). Mr. Grow denied that
he had anything to do with the acquisition orf land by Mecham from Ruben Schauerhamer and in fact testified that
Mecham had owned it many mon1Jhs before Mr. Grow even
knew about it. (Tr. 732). He further said that he had
nothing to do with the negotiations and purchase of the
four Rowley lots by Mecham or the La Mesa property and
that he did not instruct or otherwise counsel Mr. Mecham
to purchase this ground, or advise him or assist him in the
negotiatioru; for it. (Tr. 733). The Trial Court found the
facts substanti~ally as testified to by Mr. Grow.
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Appellant is not in a position to claim an estoppel
against anyone, except perhaps Mecham, because upon only one occasion was inquiry made by it or on its behalf to
Respondent as to the monies available on the mortgages,
and that was after construction had virtually ceased. (Tr.
649, 650). Appellant was then correctly informed that
there were no balances on the mortgages. If it k:new Respondent was financing Mecham's building and Mecham
wasn't paying his bills, then some prior inquiries were in
order. Appellant knew that the ownership of La Mesa
and Keyridge were different, but even with that knowledge
failed to keep or insist upon separate accounts as between
those two prodects. If it relied upon Mecham's statement
that it made no difference, then if there is any estoppel, it
would have to be against Mecham and not Respondent.
In twenty days of trial and in over 30 depositions, not

a single lien claimant, including any witness for Appellant,
could or did point to any representation made by Respondent, Cross-defendants, or any of them, whereby any lien
claimant was misled into extending credit to Mecham, or
respecting the ownership of any of the properties, either
covered by Appellant's lien or involved in this law suit. If
appellant failed to keep adequate records on which to predicate a lien, it has no one to blame but itself, and we perceive no duty on the part of Respondent to have instructed Appellant as to the requirements of the mechanics lien
la\V.
The unfortunate part of this law suit is that regaroless of the ultimate decision, the gross incompetence and
mis-management of Mecham has been responsible for a
great economic loss to all of the parties, including Respondent and Cross-defendants, and there is no way in which
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he can make restitution. As indicated above, the testimony of Mr. W. R. Jex, who was first called as an expert
by some of the lien claimants indicated that Mecham should
have been able to pay all of his bills and make a considerable profit on the construction which he undertook. Where
all of the hundreds of thousands of dollars went is still in
doubt, although an unreasonable proportion of it was undoubtedly wasted in labor, pilfering, not needed equipment,
sales forces whieh sold practically nothing, extensive advertising, and Mecham's indiscretion in expending monies
for purposes unrelated to the construction for which the)
were disbW'sed. (Tr. 399-402, 408-431). Mecham had no
records, even complete bank statements, which might have
shed some light on the subject.
POINT VIII
APPELLANT HAS NO VALID AND ENFORCEABLE LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED,
BECAUSE ITS MATERIALS WERE SOLD UPO·N AN
OPEN ACCOUNT IN THE O·RDINARY COURSE O·F
TRADE.
It is clear from the evidence and testimony at the trial,
the findings of the Trial Court, hereinbefore quoted commencing on page 8 of this brief, and the admissions of
Appellant in its brief, that the materials sold to Mecham ·
by the Appellant were sold upon an open account in the
ordinary course of trade and, as a consequence, no lien
may be asserted against part of the properties on which
some of the materials thereafter may have been used. ·Until construction had virtually ceased, Appellant was not
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particularly concerned where its materials were going.
(Tr. 628, 625-627).
In the case of B. F. Salzer Lumber Co. vs. Lindenmei~er, 131 P. 442, the c·olorado Supreme Court held that in
nrder to sustain a lien upon the property, it must appear
that the materials were expressly furnished and delivered
for use in constructing a specified building. In that case,
the contractor was engaged in building two structures for
differenrt owners and lumber furnished to the contractor
by the Hen claimant was used in both structures. The
lumber company filed a claim of lien upon both the buildings, but afterwards abandoned the elaim on one of them.
The secretary of the company said that he did not know
in which of these buildings the material ·had been used
until afte[' the completiorn of the buildings. The Court
held that no lien could attaoh under these circumstances.
In the case of W. P. Fuller & Co. vs. Flisher, 218 P.

53, the California Court, under a statute in all material respects similar to the one in the State of Utah, held that
it is the furnishing of materials to be used or consumed
in the ·construction, alteration, addition or repair O!f the
partieular building upon Which the lien is claimed, that
creates the lien. The statute does not contemplate that
a lumber merchant should have the right to follow the
material which he has sold to another, in general terms,
and assert a lien upon any building to which the materials
may have happened to have been applied. The Court further stated that in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, it
not only must be alleged and proved by the Plaintiff that
the materials were actually used or consumed in the construction, alteration, addition to or repair of the building,
but it also must be averred and proved that the material
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was furnished by the materialmen expressly for that particular building.
The Washington Supreme Court in Whittier vs. Puget Sound Loan Company, 30 P. 1094, held under a Washington statute providing that every person furnishing materials to be used in the construction of any buildings shall
have a lien therefor, that a mechanic's lien cannot be maintained against the owner of a building for materials used
in its construction which are furnished a contractor when
the claimant has no knowledge of any contract relations
existing between the contractor and owner, nor of the particular building to be constructed, but intends to hold whatever building the materials were used in as security.
The language used in the case of Eisenbeis vs. Workman, 28 P. 923, is stronger. There, the Court said that the
plain import of the language of the statute giving a mechanic's lien is that ~the materials must be furnished to be
used in a particular building upon which the lien is claimed.
The intention must have existed to claim the lien when the
merchandise was sold, and reliance had and credit extended partially, aJt least, by reason of the fact that the
materi~al was to be used in the construction of a building,
and it must have been so furnished.
See 36 Am. Jur., page 62, wherein appears the foHowing Statement:
"The lien is acquired, therefor, only when the materials are furnished with an understanding that they
are to be used for a purpose named in the statute, and
not when they are supplied under an ordinary sale on
credit or on an open account although the buyer may
actually use them in a building or improvement.''
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In a footnote to the annotation in 39 A.L.R. (2d) on
page 397, the writer says:
"It would seem to be the general rule that materials must have been sold or furnished for the purpose of being used in a particular building against
which the lien is claimed, in order to sustain a lien,
and, conversely, that no lien may be acquired for material furnished for general purposes, or sold in the
ordinary course af trade."
On facts more flavorable to the lien claimant than the
facts in this ease, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held
in the case of Tabet vs. Davenport, 260 P. (2d) 722, that
a lien claimant must allocate materials sold to a particular
building at the ti~me of sale in order to foreclose a lien.
It is not sufficient that allocation be made by a claimant
after the sale of materials has taken place, as was done in
this case. (Tr. 651) .

POINT IX
IF MEC'IIJANIC'S LIENS. IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT ARE DETERMINED TO BE VALID IN SOME
ASCERTAINABLE AMOUNTS AGAINST THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED, THE MORTGAGES· OF RESPONDENT WOULD IN ANY SUCH EVENT BE PRIOR IN RIGHT TO SUCH LIENS.

Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back
to, and take effect as orf. the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground
for the construction or improvement, and shall have
priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance
whieh may have attached subsequently to the time
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when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on
the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and
which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was ·commenced, work begun, or
first materials furnished on the ground." (Emphasis
supplied)
Tthe ~oregoing statute provides in effect that mechanic's liens attach when the first work is done or the
first materials are furnished on the ground for the structure or improvement, and has priority over a mortgage
which subsequently attaches thereto. Conversely, a mortgage which has "attached" prior to the commencement of
work or the furnishing of materials on the ground is prior
in right to mechanic's lien.
The Trial Court found specifically in all three cases
that no work was commenced or materials furnished on
the ground prior to the time the mortgages were recorded,
except on the lot described in Respondent's Sixth Cause
of Action in Civil No. 20,591. The evidence is susceptible
of no other conclusion.
(Tr. 854-860, 866-869; R. 103,
Civil No. 20,575; R. 23, Civil No. 20,591; R. 72, Civil No.
20,592; Plf. Exhibirt 45, Civil No. 20,575).
As to the property described in the Sixth Cause of
Action, Respondent admits and concedes that any mechanic's lien for rna terials furnished ''to be used'' or actually
used upon that property is prior to the mortgage thereupon. As to all other properties, it is clear that the mortgages "attached" within the meaning of Section 38-1-5,
UCA, 1953, at the time of their recordation, and art such
time, no work having been commenced and no materials
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having been furnished, Appellant's "iien" if any, is expressly rendered inferior in right.
CONCLUSION

Appellant failed in any of the three cases on this appeal to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a claim
or interest in any of the properties described in Respondent's complaints, or to establish any claims against Respondent or Cross-defendants or any of them, and the Trial
Court committed no reversible error in so holding.
There being no manifest showing by Appellant that the
Trial Court misappiied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence, such findings,
and conclusions based thereon, should not be set aside.
First Security Bank of Utah vs. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251
P. (2d) 297.
Even if the Court were wrong, however, in holding
that Appellant has no valid and enforceable liens in ascertainable amounts against the properties in the cases at
bar, such would not be prejudicial error for the reason that
such liens could not be prior to the mortgages by virtue
of Section 31-1-5, UCA, 1953. Since the propemies involved
herein were not .sold upon foreclosure sale for any amounts
in excess of the ·amounts found due on Respondent's mortgages, Appellant could have no right to any of the proceeds from such sales.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON,
and
PUGSLEY. HAYES, RAMPTON &
WATKISS,
Attorneys for Respondent
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